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REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS:
THE ONGOING DILEMMA AFTER

FTC V. ACTAVIS

INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act—also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act 1—in an effort to
lower the cost of pharmaceuticals by promoting competition in the generic
drug market and incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation. 2 The HatchWaxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 3 and
provided an expedited process for the entry of generic drugs into the
marketplace. 4 An unintended result of the Hatch-Waxman Act is the
phenomenon of reverse payment settlements.5 These settlements arise out
of patent infringement suits brought by brand-name drug manufacturers
against generic drug manufacturers that are trying to enter the market
through the expedited process provided for under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 6
The typical reverse payment settlement involves payment by the brandname drug manufacturer to the generic drug manufacturer in exchange for a
promise to delay the release of the generic version of a given drug to the
marketplace. 7 These settlements are often coined “pay-for-delay”
settlements, particularly by those who oppose them such as the Federal
Trade Commission (the FTC). 8
The practice of reverse payment settlements has both its opponents and
proponents. Reverse payment settlements are highly opposed by the FTC,
wholesale and retail pharmacies, and consumers. 9 By blocking entry of
generic drug manufacturers and thereby eliminating competition, the FTC
claims that these settlements raise potential antitrust violations under the
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.); Colleen Kelly, Article,
The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003
Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417 (2011).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
3. Kelly, supra note 1, at 417.
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
5. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281, 283 (2011); Francis P. Newell & Jonathan M. Grossman, Increased Scrutiny of
Reverse Payment Settlements; Recent Cases in E.D. of PA and 2nd Circuit Suggest Change May
Be Ahead for Pharma Clients, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 2010, at LIT7.
6. See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494–95 (2007).
7. See id. (defining various types of reverse payment settlements).
8. E.g., FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS
BILLIONS 2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FTC STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federaltrade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
9. Id.; see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013).
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Sherman Act, which prohibits certain restraints on trade. 10 Furthermore,
because of the delayed release of generic versions of drugs, reverse
payment settlements have a significant financial impact on the consumers
of pharmaceutical products. 11 Due to these concerns, among others, many
reverse payment settlements lead to antitrust litigation. 12 Proponents of
reverse payment settlements argue that these settlements help avoid hefty
costs that arise from lengthy litigation 13 and can promote competition by
leading to earlier generic market entry than would have been allowed under
the brand-name drug patent. 14
Reverse payment settlements present issues about how to deal with the
intersection of patent law and antitrust law and balance the concerns of the
various stakeholders. Recognizing this dilemma, Congress has attempted to
resolve the problems caused by reverse payment settlements for several
years through two pending bills. 15 One legislative attempt is the Preserve
Access to Affordable Generics Act bill, which would create a presumption
that reverse payment settlements are unlawful 16 and would grant broad
authority to the FTC to regulate these settlements. 17 The other major
legislative attempt is the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act
bill proposed by Congressmen Rush and Waxman. 18 This bill would
prohibit the generic drug manufacturer from receiving anything of value in
exchange for delay or other inactivity in the market. 19

10. See 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 3, 5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Jon Leibowitz,
Chairman, FTC, Address at the Center for American Progress, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’
Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) 4 (June 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay-delaysettlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conductprotect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf (arguing that reverse payment settlements are
anticompetitive).
11. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
12. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003).
13. Newell & Grossman, supra note 5, at LIT7.
14. Holman, supra note 6, at 495 (explaining how certain reverse payment settlements “can
promote competition by providing a guaranteed reduction in the effective patent term that would
not have occurred absent the patent challenge”).
15. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013); Protecting
Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2013, H.R. 3709, 113th Cong. (2013); Tania
Khatibifar, Note, The Need for a Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust Review to Evaluate Reverse
Payment Settlements, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1351, 1355 n.17 (2013).
16. S. 214 § 28(a)(2).
17. Id. § 28(e).
18. H.R. 3709.
19. Id. § 2(a).
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In addition to the public policy concerns expressed by executive
agencies, consumers, and congressmen, reverse payment settlements
divided the circuit courts for years until the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split in FTC v. Actavis. 20 The Court adopted the
“rule of reason” test, which requires courts to determine whether the reverse
payment settlement in question unreasonably restrains competition. 21 Under
the “rule of reason” test, the Court held that “likelihood of a reverse
payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and
the lack of any other convincing justification.” 22 However, the Court left
many questions unanswered, 23 which will likely result in significant
discrepancies amongst the lower courts.
While the Court’s efforts were an improvement for invoking antitrust
scrutiny, a major problem with reverse payment settlements remains—the
underlying patents of brand-name manufacturers are not being examined on
their merits. 24 This latest action by the Court represents a swing of the
pendulum away from protecting the exclusionary rights provided by a
patent under the “scope of the patent” test, toward enforcing stricter
antitrust scrutiny under the “rule of reason” test.25
This Note argues that the Supreme Court, by adopting the “rule of
reason” test, failed to achieve the proper balance between pharmaceutical
patent rights and concerns about the anticompetitive effects of reverse
payment settlements. While the Court addressed the antitrust concern by
invoking antitrust scrutiny that had been lacking, the Court failed to
sufficiently protect the property interests and economic incentives that
guide the pharmaceutical industry, which might ultimately stifle
competition. Consequently, the balance intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act
has not been achieved and must be resolved. Part I will present a
background on the generic drug FDA approval process, how this process
creates the reverse payment settlement phenomenon, the arguments for and
against reverse payment settlements, and the antitrust standards that are
typically applied by the courts when an agreement raises antitrust concerns.
Part II will briefly analyze the circuit split leading up to the Actavis
20.
21.
22.
23.

See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
Id. at 2237.
Id.
Kevin McDonald et al., Antitrust Alert: Supreme Court Holds Reverse Payment
Settlements Potentially Anticompetitive—Further Guidance Awaits, JONES DAY (June 2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/Antitrust-Alert--Supreme-Court-Holds-Reverse-Payment-SettlementsPotentially-Anticompetitive--Further-Guidance-Awaits-06-29-2013/?RSS=true (last visited Apr.
11, 2014).
24. Elai Katz, ‘Reverse Payments’ Shot Down in Third Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 2012, at 3.
25. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–37.
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decision, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both the “scope of
the patent” test adopted by the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit courts
and the “quick look rule of reason” adopted by the Third Circuit. Part III
will analyze Actavis, the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “rule of reason”
test, and why this new test fails to sufficiently protect patent rights. Part IV
proposes that legislative action is necessary following the Actavis decision
to fully address the inherent conflict between antitrust considerations and
patent rights posed by reverse payment settlements.
I. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
A. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
For a prescription drug to be produced and marketed in the United
States, it must first be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (the
FDA). 26 In order to obtain approval by the FDA, the drug manufacturer
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which requires extensive
information on the development of the drug, including results of safety
testing and any patents granted for the drug. 27 The process of completing
safety testing is very time-consuming and expensive. 28 In order to protect
the expenditures that go into the research and development of a brand-name
drug and the profits that will flow from its sales, brand-name drug
manufacturers typically apply for a patent based on the chemical
formulation of the drug prior to applying to the FDA. 29 These patents can
be granted for up to twenty years, 30 which allows the brand-name
manufacturer to reap the benefits of higher, brand-name prices for a
significant amount of time. Meanwhile, generic drug manufacturers are
unable to introduce a generic version while the exclusionary protection
provided under the brand-name drug patent is in effect. 31
The approval process for generic drug approval by the FDA is less
cumbersome than that of a brand-name drug because of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which was enacted in part to “jumpstart generic competition” by
shortening the application process and therefore the time it takes for generic
drugs to make it to market. 32 To this end, generic drug manufacturers can
apply for FDA approval using the Abbreviated New Drug Application (the
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
27. Kelly, supra note 1, at 417.
28. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849

(2013) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)).
29. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou
/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013).
30. Id.
31. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 418.
32. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
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ANDA). 33 The ANDA allows the generic drug manufacturer to “rely on the
FDA’s prior determinations of safety and efficacy made in considering the
application of the patented drug.” 34 This statutory provision allows the
generic drug manufacturer to avoid “the major investment in inventing and
developing the drug.” 35
As a part of this process, the generic drug manufacturer must certify
that the generic drug does not infringe upon a valid brand-name drug patent
by choosing one of four options. 36 The fourth option, commonly known as a
“paragraph IV certification,” is itself an act of patent infringement. 37 After
the generic drug manufacturer has filed the ANDA and provided notice to
any brand-name manufacturers with potentially affected patents, the brandname manufacturer has forty-five days to bring a patent infringement suit
against the generic drug manufacturer.38 If litigation is initiated by a brandname drug patent holder, then the FDA approval is granted either at the end
of a thirty-month period after the date of the paragraph IV certification
filing or, if earlier, then “on—(aa) the date on which the court enters
judgment reflecting the decision; or (bb) the date of a settlement order or
consent decree signed and entered by the court stating that the patent that is
the subject of the certification is invalid or not infringed.” 39 Given this
“automatic stay” that occurs, 40 settlement is a “natural consequence” of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 41 These settlements are known as “reverse payment
settlements” or “exclusion agreements” because they typically involve
funds flowing from the brand-name drug patent holder to the generic drug
manufacturer, which is atypical in patent infringement cases. 42
The Hatch-Waxman Act also encourages generic drug manufacturers to
enter the market by providing for a 180-day exclusivity period during which
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
34. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).
35. Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases Challenging Hatch-

Waxman Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 50 (2010).
36. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), a generic drug company can certify that the given
generic drug does not infringe upon a brand-name patent by claiming
(i) that such patent information has not been filed, (ii) that such patent has expired, (iii) of the
date on which such patent will expire, or (iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted.

37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) explains that it is an act of infringement to file an ANDA
application under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) when the brand-name drug that the ANDA is based on has a
patent, which is the case in a paragraph IV certification.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
39. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849
(2013).
41. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005).
42. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204; Holman, supra note 6, at 494.
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the FDA will not approve any other ANDA applications made by other
generic manufacturers of the given drug. 43 This 180-day period does not
begin until the original ANDA filer begins to offer its generic version on
the market. 44 In addition, it is only available to the first ANDA filer of a
given drug, “meaning that even if the first filer never becomes eligible to
use its 180-day exclusivity period because it settles, loses, or withdraws the
litigation that potential benefit will not pass to subsequent filers.” 45
The Hatch-Waxman Act was amended in 2003 in order to address
antitrust concerns of monopoly and collusion and “to put an end to this
exploitation of the provision in Hatch-Waxman that grants a short-term
protection from competition to the first manufacturer to bring a generic
version of a brand-name drug to market.” 46 Through the 2003 amendments,
the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice (the DOJ) became major
players in the scrutiny of reverse payment settlements. 47 One of the
provisions of the amended Hatch-Waxman Act provides that brand-name
and generic drug manufacturers that enter into settlements of their patent
litigation cases must notify both the FTC and DOJ of the settlements so that
the settlements can be analyzed for potential antitrust violations. 48 Both the
FTC and the DOJ can review the settlements for potential antitrust
violations and are able to challenge the legality of the settlements in court.49
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
The FTC has long been opposed to reverse payment settlements and has
urged the courts to find them per se illegal. 50 The FTC reports that “brandname pharmaceutical companies can delay generic competition that lowers
prices by agreeing to pay a generic competitor to hold its competing
product off the market for a certain period of time.” 51 A 2010 FTC study
reported that these settlements delay generic entry for roughly seventeen
months. 52 Under the influence of the Obama administration, the DOJ has

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
Id.
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)).
See S. REP. NO. 107-167, at 4 (2002).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
Id.; see also Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment
Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 61 n.5 (2010).
49. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 61 n.5.
50. Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and
Urging Reversal at 22, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2078,
10-2077, 10-2079), 2011 WL 2115235 at *22.
51. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
52. Id.
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also recently begun to take up the position argued by the FTC that reverse
payment settlements should be subject to a presumption of invalidity. 53
In addition to these government agencies, reverse payment settlements
are opposed by consumers, 54 as well as wholesale and retail pharmacies.55
Like consumers, pharmacies are subject to the higher costs of brand-name
drugs when generics are excluded from the market. 56 However, the crux of
the burden is carried by consumers. 57 The FTC estimates that consumers
would pay up to ninety percent less for generic drugs than they currently
spend on brand-name drugs. 58 The 2010 FTC study reported that pay-fordelay settlements cost consumers an additional $3.5 billion each year for
their drug expenses. 59 These high consumer costs are a major concern of
consumer advocacy groups 60 and the FTC. 61
C. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Proponents of reverse payment settlements argue that these settlements
actually allow generics to enter the market prior to the expiration of valid
patents. 62 Therefore, these settlements provide lower-cost, generic drugs to
consumers sooner than if generic drug manufacturers were to simply wait
for brand-name patents to expire. 63 Furthermore, these settlements protect
the exclusivity granted to the brand-name drug manufacturer through its
patent, which encourages further research and development of
pharmaceuticals. 64 In addition, reverse payment settlements are supported
by both courts 65 and litigants 66 as a way to reduce the time, money, and
uncertainty that accompanies litigation. 67
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 61.
2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 202.
Id. at 221–22.
2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
See generally Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of AARP and the Prescription
Access Litigation Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, FTC v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2454841 (explaining how reverse payment
settlements that delay entry of generics harm consumers by preventing access to lower cost
generic drugs).
61. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
62. Sophia Pearson & Jeff Bliss, Schering-Plough’s K-Dur Pay-for-Delay Ruling Reversed,
BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-16/scheringplough-s-k-dur-pay-for-delay-ruling-reversed.html.
63. See Nanci Bompey, More Pay-for-Delay Challenges Possible as SCOTUS, FTC Weigh
Options, FDA WK., Aug. 31, 2012, at 11.
64. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 418.
65. Sobel, supra note 35, at 69–70.
66. Newell & Grossman, supra note 5, at LIT7.
67. Id.
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D. HOW REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS PRESENT AN
ANTITRUST CONCERN
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.” 68 Nonetheless, the courts have traditionally only
held unreasonable restraints of trade to be violations of the Sherman Act. 69
The default standard of analysis for an antitrust claim is known as the “rule
of reason” test, 70 which the Supreme Court has delineated:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
71
are all relevant facts.

The burden-shifting involved in the “rule of reason” test includes three
parts. 72 First, anti-competitive effects must be demonstrated by the
plaintiffs. 73 Then, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.” 74
Finally, this showing may be rebutted if the plaintiff can show that the
conduct is not necessary to the pro-competitive objective given by the
defendant. 75
While a full analysis under the “rule of reason” test is typically
required, there are some restraints of trade that have such a harmful and
predictable effect without providing any pro-competitive benefits that they
are per se unlawful. 76 When per se unlawful agreements occur, “no
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive
character of such an agreement.” 77 Examples of practices that are per se
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
69. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y,

457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
70. See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
71. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
72. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849
(2013).
73. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 669.
75. Id.
76. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958).
77. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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unlawful include price fixing, tying arrangements, 78 and market
allocation. 79
Finally, a level of intermediate scrutiny exists between these two
extremes known as the “quick look rule of reason.” 80 This test is used when
the per se unlawful analysis is not suitable because the negative effects of a
particular restraint on trade are not immediately obvious. 81 Under the
“quick look rule of reason” test, anticompetitive behavior is presumed to
have occurred and “the defendant must promulgate ‘some competitive
justification’ for the restraint.” 82 If the defendant is unable to justify its
behavior, then the presumption of harm stands. 83 These three tests—the
“rule of reason,” per se unlawfulness, and the “quick look rule of reason”—
make up the traditional approaches to antitrust litigation and form the basis
of review for the antitrust claims of reverse payment settlement litigation.
Based on this framework, reverse payment settlements raise antitrust
concerns as unreasonable restraints on trade. 84 The FTC has argued that
they illegally preserve the brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly through
the delay of the generic drug. 85 Specifically, it is commonly argued that
reverse payment settlements are a classic example of per se illegal
horizontal agreements 86 in that they “permit the sharing of monopoly rents
between would-be competitors.” 87 Not only do these agreements present the
concern that the brand-name drug manufacturers will collude in order to
reap the benefits of higher drug prices, but another concern exists that
relates to potential generic drug manufacturers. Due to the 180-day
exclusivity period that is granted to the first ANDA filer, any settlement
between the first ANDA filer and the brand-name manufacturer will not
only benefit those two parties, but will also block any other generic
manufacturers during this period. 88 Both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have
expressed concern over this type of antitrust violation.89
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669.
Id.
Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)).
Id.
Kelly, supra note 1, at 463–64.
See 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 2.
Kelly, supra note 1, at 464.
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849

(2013).
88. While the 180-day exclusionary period can potentially block competition, this has been
ameliorated by an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act made by the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. Kelly, supra note 1, at 465. The amendment,
known as the “failure to market” provision, requires that the 180-day exclusionary period be
forfeited when the settlement agreement holds that the patent was invalid or not infringed and the
first ANDA filer fails to market its approved generic drug. However, this new amendment does
not prevent all situations in which market entry can be blocked by the 180-day exclusivity period,

2014]

Reverse Payment Settlements

525

E. OVERVIEW OF PATENT LAW
Intersecting with antitrust law in the reverse payment settlement cases
is patent law, which governs the treatment of the underlying drug patent.
When a brand-name drug manufacturer is granted a patent, it has a right to
exclude others from producing its patented drug and to seek injunctive
relief for any infringement of the patent. 90 This grant is made in order to
provide an appropriate incentive to the patentee for investing in research
and development. 91 This type of exclusionary power is allowed, even
though it can decrease competition and result in high prices. 92 Another
benefit of obtaining a patent is that when the patent is challenged, it is
presumed to be valid. 93
Antitrust claims are considered against this strong support of patents.
However, although the patent does provide exclusionary rights, it does not
grant power to violate antitrust law. 94 The Sherman Act limits the
exclusionary power of a patent, as anything outside of the patent’s scope is
subject to antitrust review. 95
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT LEADING UP TO ACTAVIS
A. “SCOPE OF THE PATENT” TEST
Until the Actavis decision, circuit courts routinely applied the “scope of
the patent” test to analyze reverse payment settlements.96 Under this test,
“reverse payments are permitted so long as (1) the exclusion does not
exceed the patent’s scope, (2) the patent holder’s claim of infringement was
such as when the agreement does not make a finding of patent invalidity or lack of patent
infringement. Id.
89. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
settlement in that case was “a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of
trade”); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
that the settlement in that case could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share
and preserve monopolistic conditions”).
90. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 283 (2012); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294,
1304–05 (11th Cir. 2003).
91. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304.
92. Id. at 1305.
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
94. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912); see also Joseph
Vardner, The Statutory Presumption of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
225, 226 (2011).
95. Vardner, supra note 94, at 226.
96. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug
Co., 344 F.3d at 1312.
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not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud.” 97
The test included an underlying assumption that the patent in question was
valid and, therefore, not reviewed on its merits. 98 The courts applying the
“scope of the patent” test did not apply antitrust scrutiny. 99 Essentially, as
long as the agreement was within the scope of the exclusions allowed under
the patent, the court did not question whether an antitrust violation had
occurred. 100 Only if the settlement resulted in an arrangement that exceeded
the patent would the settlement be subjected to antitrust scrutiny. 101
Several policy reasons supported the “scope of the patent” test. 102
Arguably the strongest reason in favor of this test was that it encouraged
settlement by not subjecting the reverse payment settlements to antitrust
scrutiny as long as they were within the scope of the patent. 103 Historically,
the courts have favored settlement: “there is no question that settlements
provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate
and costly effects of litigation.” 104 Settlements are especially encouraged in
patent cases because litigation can significantly drain resources of both the
courts and parties involved due to the complex issues involved. 105 The
strong presumption of patent validity 106 and the exclusionary powers of the
patent 107 are also strong policy reasons supporting this test. Additionally, by
encouraging settlement, generic drug manufacturers have an incentive to
bring a paragraph IV certification as they have more options for a favorable
outcome when challenging a brand-name drug patent. 108
Although the “scope of the patent” test was strongly supported among
the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits,109 its major weakness was that
97. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849
(2013); see also, e.g., In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212–13 (adopting the “scope of the patent”
test); Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076 (upholding the “scope of the patent” test).
98. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312.
102. See, e.g., id. at 1294; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen, 466
F.3d 187; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056.
103. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308.
104. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202 (citing Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1075).
105. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 n.20 (discussing the cost and complexity of patent
litigation); see also Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that settlements should be encouraged as they decrease the burden on federal courts).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
107. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 (explaining how the incentive for obtaining a patent
would be undermined by subjecting reverse payment settlements that are within the scope of the
patent to antitrust liability).
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A); Kelly, supra note 1, at 462–63.
109. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen, F.3d at 212;
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312.
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it presumed the validity of the patent, 110 which in turn “assumes away the
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit, enforcing a
presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed.” 111 This is
troublesome, particularly when it allows settlements based on weak or
invalid patents to be protected without any judicial scrutiny, which has
occurred in many instances. 112 In essence, this presumption allows a brandname manufacturer who knows it has a weak patent “to buy [its] way out of
both competition with the challenging competitor and possible invalidation
of the patent,” 113 a potential concern admitted by the Second Circuit. 114
Overall, the test is criticized for being overly simplistic as it “assumes
issues of validity and infringement that cannot possibly be determined from
the mere issuance of the patent.” 115
Ultimately, the “scope of the patent” test failed to protect consumers
because it was used to uphold reverse payment settlements based on weak
or invalid patents. 116 By allowing settlement, the generic drug faces a
delayed introduction to the market, during which time the higher costs of
the brand-name drug are passed on to the consumer. 117 Since the HatchWaxman Act was designed to protect the consumer, the “scope of the
patent” test did not adequately achieve this goal; it only facially protected
the patent, not based on its underlying merits, but on the patent holder’s
ability to pay the generic drug manufacturer off in order to prolong
increased drug prices for consumers. 118
B. PER SE AND PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION TREATMENT
IN EARLY CASES
Earlier in the history of reverse payment settlement litigation, the Sixth
and D.C. Circuits applied stricter antitrust scrutiny by deeming the
settlements to be per se violations of the Sherman Act 119 and prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade, respectively. 120 In Andrx
110. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2849
(2013); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
111. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
112. Id. at 214–15 (stating that “[m]any patents issued by the PTO are later found to be invalid
or not infringed, and a 2002 study conducted by the FTC concluded that, in Hatch-Waxman
challenges made under paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent of the
time”).
113. Id. at 215 (citing In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211).
114. Id.
115. Michael Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6.
116. 2010 FTC STUDY, supra note 8, at 11 n.3.
117. Id. at 2.
118. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217.
119. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
120. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l., 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, the D.C. Circuit held
the settlement to be prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation because
the agreement could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market
share and preserve monopolistic conditions.”121 The Sixth Circuit, in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 122 held the reverse payment settlement in
question to be a per se violation of antitrust laws because it was a
“horizontal agreement to eliminate competition.” 123 These cases are
instructive in developing a solution to addressing the reverse payment
settlement dilemma as they illustrate how some courts that addressed this
issue early on felt the need for a more stringent level of antitrust review.
C. “QUICK LOOK RULE OF REASON”TEST
The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation followed in the
footsteps of the D.C. Circuit’s Andrx decision by treating reverse payment
settlements as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. 124 In doing so,
the Third Circuit broke from the more recent trend of applying the “scope
of the patent” test and adopted the “quick look rule of reason” test, which
applies an intermediate level of antitrust scrutiny. 125 In using this test,
the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a generic
patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by
showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry
126
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.

Under this test, the Third Circuit aligned itself with the FTC’s stance that
the underlying patent does not need to be analyzed based on its merits
because “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was
an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents
an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.” 127
Several policy reasons favored the “quick look rule of reason” test. 128
Most significantly, this test subjected reverse payment settlements to
antitrust scrutiny and thereby encouraged competition. 129 Therefore, the test
worked to incorporate balance between patent protection and the antitrust
121. Id. This case has been distinguished because it did not involve a settlement that ended
litigation, but rather it involved compensation from the brand-name manufacturer to the generic
manufacturer while the litigation was ongoing. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210.
122. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
123. Id.
124. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003)).
128. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217–18.
129. Id.
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concerns that arose in response to the increased competition the HatchWaxman Act aimed to obtain. 130 The “quick look rule of reason” test also
protected the consumer by prohibiting unreasonable restraints to trade in the
pharmaceutical industry that excessively prolonged the entry of generics
under the given brand-name drug patent. 131
While the In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation holding had some
advantages over the “scope of the patent” test, it also had its weaknesses.
First, just as the “scope of the patent” test did not analyze the merits of the
underlying patent, neither did the Third Circuit’s test. 132 By not analyzing
the underlying patent, the “quick look rule of reason” test could potentially
fail to provide enough protection for valid or infringed patents. It is possible
that a brand-name manufacturer would rationally choose to pay off a
generic manufacturer to stop litigation or market entry, even if the brandname manufacturer knew it had a strong patent, 133 but the Third Circuit’s
test would make it harder for this type of agreement to be upheld.
Furthermore, this test would likely discourage patent infringement litigation
because the parties would know that any resulting settlements would be
seen as presumptively illegal. 134 This could then lead to fewer drug
manufacturers pursuing the introduction of a generic drug into the
market. 135
III: FTC V. ACTAVIS: A RESOLUTION TO THE ANTITRUST
PROBLEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF PATENT PROTECTION
Given these two very different approaches to resolving antitrust claims
based on reverse payment settlements, a clear need existed for the Supreme
Court to step in and provide guidance.136 This guidance came with the FTC
v. Actavis case, in which the Supreme Court adopted the “rule of reason”
test for analyzing these settlements. 137
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 217.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 214.
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated
by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the
“Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse
Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1807 (2003)
(explaining that “the plaintiff often will have an incentive to pay the defendant not to enter the
market, regardless of whether the former expects to win at trial”)).
134. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
135. See Nanci Bompey, Upsher-Smith Follows Merck in Seeking SCOTUS Review of Pay-forDelay, FDA WK., Sept. 7, 2012, at 2 (explaining that fewer generic manufacturers will file
paragraph IV certifications).
136. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
137. Id. at 2237.
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The case began when Actavis, Inc. (known as Watson Pharmaceuticals
at the time) and Paddock Laboratories, Inc. both filed for an ANDA for
approval of a generic version of AndroGel based on paragraph IV
certifications, which stated that the AndroGel patent was not valid and that
their generics would not infringe upon the AndroGel patent. 138 Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the brand-name manufacturer of AndroGel, then
initiated a patent infringement suit which eventually led to a settlement in
which Solvay agreed to pay the generic drug manufacturers millions of
dollars in order to delay market entry. 139 The FTC then brought an antitrust
claim against all of the parties to the settlement, claiming that they had
unlawfully agreed to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits in violation of the
Sherman Act. 140 The district court dismissed the FTC’s complaint for
failing to state an antitrust violation, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on the “scope of the patent” test.141
A. MAJORITY OPINION ADOPTING THE “RULE OF REASON” TEST
The Supreme Court first discarded the “scope of the patent” test as the
correct standard for reverse payment settlement antitrust cases.142 The Court
noted that the “scope of the patent” test failed to consider antitrust issues,
stating that “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by
measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law
policy.” 143 The value of settlements was also addressed, but the Court
summarily set aside that principle in this context.144 The Court also rejected
the “quick look rule of reason” test argued for by the FTC, 145 finding that
this type of test is only appropriate when “an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets” and that reverse payment settlements did not meet
that standard. 146
Instead, the Court adopted the “rule of reason” test 147 and “answered
the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust factors, such as
likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and
potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, such

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 2229.
Id.
Id. at 2229–30.
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2231.
Id.
Id. at 2234.
Id. at 2237.
Id.
Id.
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as here those related to patents.” 148 In analyzing these antitrust factors, the
Court highlighted “five sets of considerations” as to why the antitrust claim
should have moved forward. 149 These included (1) that a reverse settlement
payment can have anticompetitive effects, (2) that sometimes these
anticompetitive effects are unjustified, (3) “where a reverse payment
threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely
possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice,” for example by
paying off a generic to maintain monopoly profits, (4) “an antitrust action is
likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit
believed,” and (5) that parties may settle patent cases through methods other
than large, unjustified reverse payments like early entry without a
payment. 150 Finally, the Court concluded by leaving “to the lower courts the
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.” 151
B. DISSENTING OPINION ARGUING FOR THE CONTINUED USE OF
THE “SCOPE OF THE PATENT” TEST
The dissent, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, argued for the
continued use of the “scope of the patent” test, emphasizing that patents are
an important exclusion to antitrust law.152 The dissent also noted that brandname manufacturers may have rational reasons for paying off generics,
even if they are nearly sure that their patents are valid or infringed.153 In
criticizing the “amorphous” 154 and “unruly” 155 test adopted by the majority,
the dissent argued that the “rule of reason” test may discourage the
settlement of patent litigation. 156
C. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S RESPONSE: A CONTINUING LACK OF
BALANCE
To assess Actavis and determine whether it will help to resolve the
dilemma presented by reverse payment settlements, it is important to revisit
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of its overarching goals was to
provide incentives that would allow for an appropriate balance between
encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and encouraging the
entry of generic versions of drugs to the market. 157 Indeed, the Court in
Actavis emphasized the need to consider both antitrust and patent policies in
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2234.
Id. at 2234–37.
Id. at 2238.
Id. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2244–45.
Id. at 2238.
Id. at 2245.
Id. at 2247.
130 CONG. REC. 24,425 (1984); Kelly, supra note 1, at 417.
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this context. 158 At the core of encouraging innovation among brand-name
drug manufacturers is the protection provided by patents, which makes
research and development costs worthwhile. 159 Meanwhile, antitrust
scrutiny should be applied to ensure that generic drug manufacturers are not
being bought out of the market by brand-name drug manufacturers
attempting to retain their monopoly rents. 160 Thus, the principles of patent
and antitrust law stand in conflict with one another in the reverse payment
settlement context 161 and should be carefully balanced to protect all
stakeholders.
The Supreme Court took a positive step forward in appropriately
resolving the reverse payment settlement dilemma by determining that
antitrust scrutiny must be applied to reverse payment settlements. 162
Antitrust scrutiny was sorely lacking from the “scope of the patent” test line
of decisions as discussed at length by the court in Actavis. 163 Antitrust
concerns can arise in settlements that involve both valid and invalid
patents, 164 and the Supreme Court filled the void that was missing in cases
that were decided under the “scope of the patent” test. Furthermore, by
choosing the “rule of reason” test, the court provided for a flexible, case-bycase approach, 165 which is also consistent with the balance intended by the
Hatch-Waxman Act. However, to achieve true balance, patent law concerns
must be addressed as well.
Throughout the history of reverse payment settlements, there has been a
significant lack of analysis of the underlying patent issues in these cases.166
Actavis proved to be no exception. 167 While the Court indicated early on in
its opinion that one of the “traditional antitrust factors” included “those
related to patents,” 168 the court also stated that “it is normally not necessary

158. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
159. Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical

Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 398 (2010).
160. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
161. Dolin, supra note 5, at 318.
162. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231; see also Brianna Ford, Comment, Using Reverse Payment
Agreements as an Effective Way to Maintain a Patent Monopoly in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L., 919, 931 (2013).
163. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–37.
164. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013) (explaining how reverse payment settlements can allow for the settling parties to
share monopoly rents, whether or not the patent is valid).
165. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
166. E.g., Vardner, supra note 94, at 226; Khatibifar, supra note 15, at 1392–93.
167. See Aaron Kesselheim & Nathan Shiu, FTC v. Actavis: The Supreme Court Issues a
Reversal on Reverse Payments, HEALTH AFF. (June 21, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013
/06/21/ftc-v-actavis-the-supreme-court-issues-a-reversal-on-reverse-payments/.
168. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
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to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.” 169 The Court
further elaborates:
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that
the patentee has serious doubt about the patent’s survival. . . . [T]he size of
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed
170
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.

This analysis left it unclear how the lower courts should deal with the
patent’s merits. 171 In fact, this nearly implies that a large reverse payment
settlement can be presumed to be unlawful, which makes this test seem
more like the “quick look rule of reason.” 172 By failing to give sufficient
consideration to the patent issues, the Court’s decision represents a change
from the lower courts’ emphasis on the protection provided for by the
patent to the exclusion of the antitrust concerns, to a focus on the antitrust
concerns to the exclusion of the protections provided by the patent. Reverse
payment settlements arise due to patent infringement litigation.173 Since the
original claim in the patent infringement litigation centers on the validity or
infringement of a patent, it is natural to begin analysis of reverse payment
settlements with the merits of the underlying patent.174
Several policy reasons also support the need for analysis of the
underlying patent. On a fundamental level, patents that have not been
subjected to any type of review and are merely presumed to be valid should
not be allowed to prevent a generic drug manufacturer from entering the
market. 175 The Supreme Court has supported the need for testing patents to
eliminate those that are undeserving in prior cases, so that weak patents are

169. Id. at 2236.
170. Id. at 2236–37.
171. See Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual

Dinner: FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payments 15 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reversepayment-cases/130926actavis.pdf; McDonald et al., supra note 23.
172. Wright, supra note 171, at 9 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37–38 (1981), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public
/pdf.nsf/lookup/antitrust.pdf/$file/antitrust.pdf).
173. See e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013).
174. See Dickey et al., supra note 159, at 399; see also Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse
Payment Settlements—The Agenda for Courts and the Legislature After the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 124 (2013) (explaining how patent
validity and infringement are the key to whether reverse payment settlements are anticompetitive).
175. C. Scott Hemphill, Milton Handler Antitrust Lecture: Collusive and Exclusive Settlements
of Intellectual Property Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 685, 706; see also Vardner, supra
note 94, at 226.
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not used to harm the public. 176 Moreover, the process through which patents
are issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the USPTO) has been
criticized as resulting in undeserving patents.177 Many recently challenged
patents have later been declared invalid.178
Although these considerations suggest a need for a review of the
underlying patent, doing so would create a conundrum. If the lower courts
must resolve the underlying patent claims, this could remove the reasons for
entering into a reverse payment settlement in the first place. 179 Thus, the
incentives for challenging a patent through paragraph IV certification could
decrease, 180 as the generic drug manufacturer will not have as many options
when challenging the patent.
Additional problems with the “rule of reason” test adopted in Actavis
could also have dampening effects on reverse payment settlements. 181 As
the analysis required under a “rule of reason” test is typically quite
extensive and costly, 182 the incentives for settling will be lowered. It is also
possible that companies will be more hesitant to enter into reverse payment
settlements if they will face stricter antitrust scrutiny. 183 Since the Court left
it to lower courts to develop the structure of the “rule of reason” test in this
context, 184 how exactly these cases will actually be handled remains to be
seen. 185 However, more confusion will certainly follow this decision as the
lower courts once again try to address the problems associated with reverse
payment solutions. 186

176. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993); Cory Ingle,
Reverse Payment Settlements: A Patent Approach to Defending the Argument for Illegality, 7
ISJLP 503, 526 (2012) (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
177. See Ian Hastings, Dynamic Innovative Inefficiency in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements,
13 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 31, 62 (2011); see also Hemphill, supra note 175, at 706 (stating that patents
receive limited scrutiny during the examination process at the USPTO).
178. Picht, supra note 174, at 119; Vardner, supra note 94, at 225 (citing Decisions for 2000–
2004, PATSTATS, http://www.patstats.org/2000-04.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014)).
179. Picht, supra note 174, at 124.
180. See Bompey, supra note 135, at 11 (explaining that fewer generic manufacturers will file
paragraph IV certifications).
181. See Jonathan Gardner, Limited Win for Both Sides in “Pay-for-Delay” Judgment, EP
VANTAGE (June 18, 2013), http://www.epvantage.com/Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id
=436414&isEPVantage=yes; Bradley Graveline & Jennifer Driscoll-Chippendale, FTC v.
Actavis: What Does It Mean for Reverse Payment Settlements?, FDA L. UPDATE BLOG (June 20,
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.com/2013/06/articles/ip-and-technology-transactions/ftc-v-actaviswhat-does-it-mean-for-reverse-payment-settlements/.
182. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 48, at 114.
183. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2238 (majority opinion).
185. Wright, supra note 171, at 15.
186. Graveline & Driscoll-Chippendale, supra note 181; McDonald et al., supra note 23.
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IV: THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO THE
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT DILEMMA
To resolve the ongoing legal problems and questions presented by
reverse payment settlements, 187 Congress should step in once again to
provide guidance on how to properly balance the tension between antitrust
law and patent law. At times, this tension can seem irreconcilable.188 Under
the “rule of reason” test articulated in Actavis, if a brand-name drug
manufacturer can raise the defense of having a valid or infringed patent,
then the antitrust suit may evolve into the very patent suit the reverse
payment settlement was designed to avoid. 189 However, at the core of
whether a reverse payment settlement is anticompetitive is whether it is
based on a valid or infringed patent. Since the reverse payment settlement
dilemma raises important policy considerations about whose interests to
protect and how to deal with the intersection of patent law and antitrust law,
a legislative approach would leave these questions in the hands of policy
makers. 190 Congress could alleviate the numerous questions remaining after
Actavis once all of the policy considerations have been carefully balanced.
Finally, legislation could help to benefit consumers more swiftly—those
who are hurt the most by the delay of generic entry caused by reverse
payment settlements 191—by avoiding the years of judicial uncertainty that
are likely to follow Actavis. 192
The two currently pending bills, The Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs Act of 2013 and The Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act, provide potential solutions. 193 By allowing for more
flexibility in cases where reverse payment settlements are not
anticompetitive, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act provides a
superior legislative resolution. 194 This bill would create a presumption of
illegality for reverse payment settlements that delay generic entry into the
market. 195 The obvious advantage of this bill would be to provide a clear
rule to be applied by the courts, thereby preserving judicial resources.
Furthermore, by creating a presumption of illegality, it is highly likely that
187.
188.
189.
190.

See Wright, supra note 171, at 8; see also McDonald et al., supra note 23.
Wright, supra note 171, at 15.
McDonald et al., supra note 23.
Timothy A. Cook, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent
& Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 417, 442
(2011).
191. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013).
192. See McDonald et al., supra note 23.
193. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Protecting
Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2013, H.R. 3709, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Picht,
supra note 174, at 131–33.
194. S. 214; see also Picht, supra note 174, at 133.
195. S. 214 § 3; see also Cook, supra note 190, at 442.
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fewer reverse payment settlements would be entered into, thus cutting down
on the chances of potential delay in the market entry of generic drugs. In
turn, consumers would benefit by gaining access to lower-cost generic
drugs. 196 The major disadvantage to legislation is that reverse payment
settlement suits would not be decided based on a flexible, case-by-case
approach. 197 The presumption of illegality could be over-inclusive and
prevent some settlements that are not anticompetitive. 198 However, the
reverse payment settlement dilemma raises important policy considerations
about whose interests to protect and how to deal with the intersection of
patent law and antitrust law, and a legislative approach would at least leave
these questions in the hands of policy-makers. 199 After all, the reverse
payment settlement dilemma was created by legislators, and likewise it
should be resolved by legislators.
CONCLUSION
With generics typically costing thirty to eighty percent less than their
brand-name versions, and ten percent of the nation’s health care costs spent
on prescription drugs, the generic drug market must be encouraged. 200
However, it is only through innovation, research, and development of drugs
protected by patents that future advances in the pharmaceutical industry will
become available to consumers. 201 In analyzing any reverse payment
settlement, a balance between these areas of law must be achieved in order
to protect the various stakeholders. Before Actavis, the majority of the
circuit courts upheld the exclusivity of the patent, but they presumed that
antitrust scrutiny was unnecessary as long as the agreement was within the
scope of the patent. 202 Under Actavis, the Supreme Court went too far in
correcting this shortcoming by downplaying the need for review of the
underlying patent. Ultimately, as the reverse payment settlement dilemma
presents important policy concerns, this issue should be dealt with by

196. Laura J. Grebe, Comment, Generic Entry in a Rough Economy—Proposed Legislation
May Ease Health Care Costs, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 167, 188 (2010) (explaining how
consumers stand to benefit from a prior version of the Preserve Access to the Affordable Access
of Generics Act).
197. See Cook, supra note 190, at 442.
198. See Alyssa L. Brown, Comment, Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem: Patent
Misuse and Incremental Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act as Solutions to the Problem of
Reverse Payment Settlements, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 583, 603 (2012).
199. Cook, supra note 190, at 442.
200. See Grebe, supra note 196, at 188 (citing S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2006)).
201. Dickey et al., supra note 159, at 398.
202. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Congress, which has addressed this issue in the past and continues to work
toward a reasonable solution. 203
Ann L. Knuckles *

203. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013);
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2013, H.R. 3709, 113th Cong. (2013).
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